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Abstract. The paper presents and discusses a procedure for
the evaluation of the collective risk that can affect a road sub-
jected to rockfalls, with and without protection measures, by
means of the event tree analysis. This tool is useful to show
designers whether the rockfall protection structures are lo-
cated in the correct positions, whether they are the correct
technological choice and what level of reduction of risk can
be obtained. Different design options can therefore be com-
pared on the same bases.
1 Introduction
The fulfilment of safety requirements for routes in mountain-
side areas often requires that protection measures are taken
to control the incidence of rockfalls. The types of events and
accidents that can be caused by rockfalls along railways and
roads, range from minor falls that damage tyres and vehi-
cle bodyworks, to larger falls that directly affect vehicles or
cause vehicles to swerve off the road.
The effects of these events can be the damage of vehicles,
injuries or the death of drivers or passengers and economic
loss due to road closure (Duncan and Norman, 1996). Fur-
thermore, the cost of a single car accident can be significant
since it can involve the hospitalisation of the driver and pas-
sengers, the repair of the vehicle, the legal costs and compen-
sation and, on occasion, the owner of the road or the designer
of the existing protection works can be subjected to an offi-
cial enquiry by the state prosecutor.
The most frequent causes of rockfall are mainly related to
water: rain, freeze-thaw, snowmelt, channel runoff, differen-
tial erosion, springs or seeps and the growth of tree roots in
cracks, which can open fractures and loosen blocks on the
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slope. The other main group of factors affecting stability on
rock slopes is represented by the geologic and geotechnical
conditions of each site, namely, fractured rock, adverse dip of
the joints and soil decomposition and earthquakes can trigger
collapse (Peckover and Kerr, 1977; Giani, 1992; Duncan and
Norman, 1996; Guzzetti et al., 2003; Wieczorek et al., 2008;
Casale et al., 2008). If the detached rock block moves down-
wards towards the infrastructures and interferes with them,
it is necessary to design protection works that are able to in-
tercept the blocks and stop them (Peckover and Kerr, 1977;
Duncan and Norman, 1996; Peila et al., 1998, 2006, 2007;
Pelizza et al., 2004), such as ground embankments and net
fences, which must be placed on the slopes after an evalua-
tion of the possible trajectories of the falling blocks.
The design of rock slope reclamation is based on two fun-
damental steps: the hazard analysis of the natural area that
has to be reclaimed and the design of protection techniques.
These analyses are characterized by a high level of variability
due to the complexity of a precise quantification of the prob-
ability of occurrence of the rockfall. Many procedures can be
found in technical literature to classify the risk of an infras-
tructure located near unstable rock slopes, e.g. the Rockfall
Hazard Rating System – RHRS (Pierson et al., 1990, Evans
et al., 1993), the Rock Engineering System (RES) (Hudson,
1992; Cancelli and Crosta, 1999; Crosta and Agliardi, 2003),
the modified RHRS (Budetta, 2004), the Rockfall Hazard
Assessment Procedure (RHAP) developed by Lombardia Re-
gion (Italy) (Crosta et al., 2001). These methods are based
on the rock mass condition, on the road characteristics, on
the climate and on previous rockfall events: each of these
variables is associated to an index which, combined together,
gives the hazard level of the area, expressed as the probability
that a rockfall event will occur in the analysed area but they
do not provide any indication on how the technical interven-
tion could reduce the risk condition and do not give a direct
numerical evaluation of the obtained improvement level.
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Fig. 1. General scheme of the event tree.
The Swiss federal services in charge of natural hazards
have developed the concepts of danger zones coupling haz-
ards zones and intensity of natural phenomenon (i.e. total ki-
netic energy for rockfalls). Contrasting with risk analysis,
zoning depends on a normative category of hazard defined
on potential damage of buildings representing a sort of risk
analysis for one hazard type, because danger zones imply
degrees of damages. (Lateltin, 1997; Raetzo et al., 2002;
Jaboyedoff et al., 2005)
Apart from the global risk assessment of rock slopes sub-
jected to rockfall events, another important design step is the
definition of a block trajectory (that is, the path length, the
height, the velocity and the energy assumed by the block dur-
ing the fall) and many procedures for the numerical analysis
of this phenomenon have been set up above all over the last
twelve years (Giani, 1992). Generally speaking, all these
numerical or analytical rockfall modelling require the deter-
mination of the geometrical and physical characteristics of
the falling slope and of the rock block. The principal geo-
metrical features refer to the slope topography, the block size
and its shape while the physical characteristics are the initial
free falling block velocity, the coefficient of restitution of the
slope surface (describing the response of the slope surface
to the impact event) and the sliding and rolling friction co-
efficient. The definition of these parameters is quite difficult
and these parameters are therefore usually assumed not as
deterministic values but rather by varying them within a pre-
defined range. The computation, therefore, provides a family
of collapse trajectories. When the best position (taking into
account the slope geometry, the available areas and other ge-
ometrical, operational and geotechnical constraints) has been
decided on and the best intercepting structure has been cho-
sen, it is rare, in design practice, that these devices can in-
tercept all the computed trajectories, thus the hazard cannot
be reduced to zero but only significantly reduced. Further-
more, the possibility of a single unusual and random event
occurring, cannot be excluded and a residual risk is always
present.
As a consequence of these aspect for a reliability-based
design (JCSS, 2001) acceptability limits have to be set and
a comparison of the probability of injury or loss of human
lives before and after the installation of the protection de-
vices must be computed. The event tree appears to be a good
tool for these studies (Bunce et al., 1997; Hoek, 2000; Lo-
catelli, 2005; Oggeri and Tosco, 2005) since it permits the
various events that can occur to be taken into account and the
various conditions before and after the protection device in-
stallation to be compared. A global procedure for the use of
the event tree for the evaluation of the risk of a road subjected
to rockfall is discussed to show its potentiality.
2 The event tree
The event tree is a system which is applied to analyse all
the combinations (and the associated probability of occur-
rence) of the parameters that affect the system under analy-
sis. All the analysed events are linked to each other by means
of nodes (Fig. 1): all possible states of the system are consid-
ered at each node and each state (branch of the event tree) is
characterised by a defined value of probability of occurrence.
The fundamental properties of the event tree can be sum-
marized as follows:
· events which start from the same node are auto-
excluding and the sum of the respective probabilities of
occurrence must be equal to one, that is, with reference
to Fig. 1:

∑
P(nA)=1∑
P(nB)=1∑
P(nC)=1
(1)
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Fig. 2. Steps 1 and 2 of the event tree analysis: definition of Ntot, Nr and Ns .
· the probability of occurrence of each path (P(Rn)) is a
function of all the branches that are included in it. Again
with reference to Fig. 1:
P(R1)=P(1A)
P (R2)=P(2A)·P(1B)
. . .
P (R6)=P(3A)·P(3C)
(2)
It is necessary to identify the consequences (potential value
of loss) linked to the specific sequence of events for each
path obtained from the event tree. The aim of this analysis
is to compute the risk value which affects a road subjected
to rockfalls (Guardini et al., 2006). Quantitatively, risk is de-
fined as a function of the probability of occurrence of a haz-
ard process (P ) (UN/ISDR, 1994) and the expected degree
of damage, the latter being a product of the damage potential
and the corresponding vulnerability (D) (Varnes, 1984). The
general risk formula is:
R=P ·D (3)
Using this approach and evaluating the probability of occur-
rence that a falling rock directly impacts a car and/or damage
the road basement thus causing a car accident, it is therefore
possible to compute the collective which express the risk of
the road as the number of fatalities per year, taking into ac-
count the number of cars travelling on the road per year. If
the obtained value is not acceptable, because it is too high
with reference to national standards, regulations or guide-
lines (Wilhelm, 1997, 1999; Borter, 1999; Bell and Glade,
2004; Lateltin et al., 2005; Mo¨lk et al., 2008), it is possible to
carry out the analysis again, considering the presence of pro-
tection systems, that reduce the probability of a falling rock
intercepting the road, thus reducing the probability of occur-
rence of a fatality and consequently the collective risk of the
road. The proposed tool, based on an event tree approach,
therefore allows a simple comparison to be made between
different protection devices and design choices, according to
their ability to reduce the collective risk on the road. The
“optimal” solution which gives an acceptable value of the
residual risk can therefore be chosen and justified. Using the
computed value of the collective risk, it is then possible to
simply evaluate the individual fatality risk for the people that
use the road (Zischg et al., 2005). Furthermore, the described
event tree approach permits the evaluation of the probability
of occurrence of non fatal accidents, which values is impor-
tant for the cost-benefits analysis.
The first step of the analysis involves the choice of the
number of rocks that can fall from the slope during a prede-
fined time interval (i.e. one year). Unfortunately rock failure
probability is often unknown and the exact rock block sizes
are often difficult to be evaluated (Wieczoreck et al. 1998;
Vengeon et al., 2001; Dussauge et al., 2003). If the site is
well known and well monitored, the number of rocks falling
from the slope during a predefined time interval (Ntot) can
be obtained from an analysis of previous rockfall events (his-
torical catalogue) or the rock failure rating systems can be
used (Cancelli and Crosta, 1993; Mazzoccola and Hudson,
1996; Rouller at al., 1998; Mo¨lk et al., 2008). Alternatively,
one solution could be to assess several scenarios for differ-
ent return periods for rock failure and volumes, depending
on the knowledge of the mean rock failure probability for a
specific instability and the knowledge of the site geomechan-
ical condition (Derron et al., 2005). For example, Jaboyedoff
et al. (2005) proposed using the mean of the return period
classes of the Swiss codes (Lateltin, 1997) where the prob-
ability of occurrence, or return period, is considered high if
more than one event occurs in 30 years, medium if the return
period is between 30 and 100 year, low if it is between 100
and 300 years and is assumed nil if it is over 300 years.
The second step is the definition of the number of events,
among Ntot, that actually hit the road (Nr ), and that do not in-
terfere with the road (Ns). These values can be obtained from
an analysis of the previous events or, alternatively, through
the evaluation of the trajectory analysis by calculating the
percentage of all simulated trajectories that cross a point (2-
D models) or an area (3-D models). The logical scheme
of these two steps is shown in Fig. 2 while the complete
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Fig. 3. General scheme of the event tree proposed for the analysis of the probability of a fatal accident due to a rockfall on a road.
sequence of possible events leading to a fatal accident is
shown in Fig. 3. The required input data are: the length of
the slope under analysis (Lp), the average (or limit) speed
of the vehicles (Vv), the average vehicle length (Lv) and the
number of vehicles travelling on the road per day (Nv).
3 Development of the procedure and application
example
In order to explain how the proposed approach can be ap-
plied, it is necessary to take the scheme shown in Fig. 3 as a
reference, where the various probabilities of each branch can
be evaluated by means of different approaches: numerical
evaluation, predefined assumption and elaboration of statis-
tical data from national databases.
For a better comprehension of the proposed approach, it
has been found easier to carry out the computation of real
data of a stretch of a mountainside local road that crosses a
debris fan subjected to rockfall from a 200 m high overhang-
ing rock slope (Table 1), and to give an explanation of the
various steps.
Once parameter Nr (number of rockfall events per year
that hit the road) has been defined, it is possible to compute
the probability that a vehicle travelling on a road is hit by
a falling rock (P1), this being a function of two simultane-
ous events: spatial and temporal correspondence between the
rock and the vehicle (to have the accident, the block and the
vehicle have to fill the same space at the same moment). It
is possible to express the probability that a generic vehicle is
hit by a rock (P(Av)) as shown in Eq. (4).
P(A)v=P(S)·P(T |S) (4)
where
P(S): the probability of spatial correspondence between the
rock and the vehicle;
P(T |S): the probability of temporal correspondence be-
tween the rock and the vehicle.
In this way P1 can be calculated as the product of the
generic probability P(A)v for one vehicle and the number
of vehicles travelling on the road per year (Nv/a), as shown
in Eq. (5).
P1=P(A)tot=P(A)v·Nv/a (5)
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It is possible to apply the binomial theorem (Benjamin and
Cornell, 1970) to calculate P(S), defining P(S,Na) as the
probability of Na vehicles being hit when Nr rocks fall:
P(S,Na)=P(S|H)
Na(1−P(S|H))(Nr−Na)Nr !
Na !(Nr−Na)! (6)
where P(S|H): probability that a vehicle occupies the por-
tion of the road affected by a rockfall.
If a constant probability of rock detachment along the con-
sidered portion of road is considered, P(S|H) can be sim-
plified as the ratio between the vehicle length and the slope
length:
P(S|H)=Lv
Lp
(7)
It is possible to point out that if Na=0, Eq. (6) reduces to the
probability that no vehicles are hit:
P(S, 0)=(1−P(S|H))Nr (8)
and the probability that one ore more vehicles are hit, which
corresponds to the previous definition of spatial correspon-
dence between the block and the vehicle, is therefore given
by Eq. (9):
P(S)=1−(1−P(S|H))Nr (9)
P(T |S), which has been defined (Eq. 4) as the probability of
temporal correspondence between the block and the vehicle,
can be assumed equal to the part of the year occupied by a
single passing of the vehicle through the section (Eq. 10),
where slope length Lp is expressed in kilometres and vehicle
speed Vv is expressed in kilometres per hour.
P(T |S)=
(
Lp
Vv
)/
8760 (10)
Once these two parameters (P(S), P(T |S)) have been cal-
culated, it is possible to obtain P(A)v by applying Eq. (4),
which substituted in Eq. (5), gives P1 (probability per year
that a vehicle is impacted by a block):
P(S|H)=Lv
Lp
= 5.4
400
=1.35·10−2 (11)
P(S)=1−(1−P(S|H))Nr=1−(1−1.35·10−2)2.5=3.34·10−2 (12)
P(T |S)=
(
Lp
Vv
)/
8760 =
(
400·10−3
80
)/
8760=5.71·10−7 (13)
P1=P(A)tot=P(A)v·Nv/a=P(S)·P(T |S)·Nv/a
=P(S)·P(T |S)·Nv·365=3.34·10−2·5.71·10−7·250·365
=1.74·10−3 (14)
Fig. 4. Rockfall size distribution for the analysed example.
The probability that no vehicles is hit by a block (P1’) is
given by the ones complement of P1 (Eq. 15). In the fol-
lowing, the calculation of denied probabilities Pn’ is not re-
peated.
P1′=1−P1=0.99 826 (15)
Continuing with the analysis of the event tree (Fig. 3), given
a rockfall event and the collision with a moving vehicle, the
probability of a fatal accident (P2) has been assumed equal
to 0.2, according to what has been proposed by Bunce et
al. (1997). It was assumed that a rock with sufficient energy
to deform the asphalt could penetrate the skin of a car and
could seriously injure or kill one or more occupants. In the
case of a stationary vehicle, the probability of death due to
an impact could be assumed to be 0.125 this is based on the
approximation that 0.25 of the length of an average vehicle is
occupied by passengers in addition is assumed that no more
than one out of two falls that impact a person result in death
(these assumption also make some allowance for the aver-
age vehicle not occupying the full width of the road). This
assumption is clearly linked to the falling rock size: if the
rock is larger that 0.5 m, it is more realistic to assume that
each impact could kill the impacted passenger. Therefore, in
order to apply the proposed procedure, it is necessary to con-
sider the most probable size of the impacting block. A killing
probability of 0.5 has been considered in the example. This
value is assumed to be higher for a moving vehicle (0.2 in-
stead of 0.125) because, apart from the possibility of direct
impact with passengers, it includes the detrimental effect of a
rock impact on the performance of the vehicle (e.g. the driver
might lose control of the vehicle). Similar probability values
were proposed by Zischg et al. (2005), for the probability of
death in vehicles caused by an avalanche incident, according
to the calculation procedure proposed by Wilhelm (1999).
In the case where the rock does not hit the vehicle, it is
necessary to verify whether the road surface has been dam-
aged by the impact in such a way as to represent a possible
cause of accident for a vehicle travelling on it. This event, as-
sociated to the probability P3 (Fig. 3), has been considered
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Table 1. Input data assumed for the analysis. The number of rocks
hitting the road was evaluated from the analysis of a real site where
it was possible to collect information of rockfall events covering a
period of 30 years. The geomorphological situation of the consid-
ered example is that of a local mountain side road that crosses a de-
bris fan subjected to rockfall from a 200 m high overhanging rock
slope. The event historical catalogue shows that it is possible to
have one rockfall event per year, with an average number of blocks
per event ranging from 10 to 30. Thus, starting from the number
of events per year (Ntot), the number of rocks hitting the road (Nr )
was computed through a two-dimensional trajectory analysis, with
the simulation of 5000 events, evaluating the percentage of blocks
that crosses the position of the road on the fan, in a similar way to
the approach proposed by Jaboyedoff at al. (2005).
Analysed case
Length of the slope Lp 400 m
Limit vehicle speed Vv 80 km/h
Average vehicle length Lv 5.4 m
Number of rocks hitting the road (per year) Nr 2.5
possible only if the rock has a volume of 0.065 m3 or more.
This choice is based on the consideration that a block impact-
ing on a horizontal surface can create a hole comparable to
its average size and that only if the hole is larger and deeper
than the radius of a car wheel, it can cause a diversion of the
wheel itself. For the definition of this probability, it is there-
fore essential to estimate the size distribution of the falling
rock, in order to calculate the probability of damage to the
road surface. In the example, given the distribution shown in
Fig. 4, obtained from the historical catalogue, which shows
that 30% of the falling rocks have a larger volume than the
assumed limit, the value of P3 is 0.3.
The probability of falling rock stopping on the road (P4)
should be determined through a trajectory analysis and this
value is given by analysing the stop distribution. The value
P4=0.5 has been assumed in the example.
The probability of a travelling vehicle hitting a previously
fallen rock (P5) can be calculated according to the proposal
of Bunce et al. (1997) and it is linked to the possibility that
the driver can see the block on the road and has the time
to avoid the impact by changing trajectory or stopping the
car. To evaluate this probability, it is necessary to introduce
the decision sight distance (Ldsd): when a driver sees a rock
on the road he must take a quick decision to either stop or
swerve. The decision sight distance is the distance the vehi-
cle travels in the time necessary to implement this decision.
This parameter can be determined, for example, according
to the document drawn up by the American Association of
State Highway and Transportation Officials (2001) where it
is linked to the type of road and to the speed of the car (Ta-
ble 2), but it obviously also depends on the local geometrical
conditions: for example, if the stretch of road subjected to the
Table 2. Decision Sight Distance according to AASHTO (2001).
Vehicle speed Decision Sight Distance (m)
(km/h)
Rural Suburban Urban
road road road
50 145 170 195
60 170 205 235
70 200 235 275
80 230 270 315
90 270 315 360
100 315 355 400
110 330 380 430
120 360 415 470
130 390 450 510
rockfall is just behind a curve, the probability that the driver
does not have sufficient time to take the decision is high and
this local condition must be taken into account to evaluate
P5. Since the example concerns a local suburban road with
a maximum allowable speed of 80 km/h and no particular ge-
ometrical conditions, the value ofLdsd is assumed to be equal
to 270 m, according to AASHTO (2001). The P5 value can
therefore be calculated as the product of the generic proba-
bility of an accident P(A)′v for one vehicle and the number
of vehicles travelling on the road per year (Nv/a), in a simi-
lar way as to what was done for the calculation of P1. The
probability of spatial correspondence between the rock and
the vehicle P(S)’ is now assumed to be a function of half the
Decision Sight Distance Ldsd. Equations (16), (17), (18) and
(19) show the complete calculation.
P5=P(A)′tot=P(A)′v·Nv/a=P(S)′·P(T |S)·Nv/a (16)
where:
P(S)′=1−(1−P(S|H)′)Nr=1−(1−0.34)2.5=0.64 (17)
P(S|H)′=Ldvd
2Lp
= 270
2·400=0.34 (18)
P(T |S)=
(
Lp
Vv
)/
8760=
(
400·10−3
80
)/
8760=5.71·10−7 (19)
Substituting the obtained values it is possible to compute the
probability of accident for a single vehicle (Eq. 20) and the
annual probability P5 (Eq. 21).
P(A)′v=P(T |S)×P(S)′=5.71·10−7·0.64=3.67·10−7 (20)
P5=P(A)tot=P(A)v·Nv·365=3.67·10−7·250·365=3.35·10−2 (21)
The probability of a fatal accident due to the impact between
a moving vehicle and a fallen rock has been assumed equal to
0.1 according to Bunce et al. (1997). This value is lower that
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the one calculated for the “moving vehicle-falling rock” case
because it takes into account the possibility that the reaction
of the driver, while travelling the Decision Sight Distance,
has a positive consequence.
In the eventuality that the rock severely damages the as-
phalt, the probability that a travelling vehicle has an acci-
dent due to the damaged road surface (P7) has been assumed
equal to 1.11·10−2 (percentage of accidents per year) and the
probability per year of death due to a damaged road surface
P8 has been assumed from the same source to be 4.9·10−2.
These values have been obtained from an elaboration of Ital-
ian Institute of Statistics concerning the main causes of road
accidents over the years 2003–2004 on the whole Italian road
network.
Considering the branches of the event tree that exclude se-
vere damage to the road surface, given the rockfall event,
the rock could either stop on the road (P9) or not (P9’),
These values correspond to P4 and P4’, which have al-
ready been calculated (P4=P9=0.5; P4’=P9’=0.5). Fi-
nally, the two lower braches present events that have already
been analysed: the probability of a vehicle having an acci-
dent due to impact with a fallen rock (P10=P5=3.35·10−2)
and the probability that this accident has fatal consequences
(P11=P6=0.1).
The proposed approach provides 12 different paths: the
probability of occurrence of each of them can be calculated
from the product of each single event that constitutes the path
itself.
For example, if the first path, which results in a fatal ac-
cident is analysed, it can be observed that the related proba-
bility is given by the product of the annual probability that a
rock hits the vehicle (P1) and the probability that this acci-
dent is fatal (P2):
P(path 1)=P1·P2=1.74·10−3×0.2=3.48·10−4 (22)
It is possible to calculate the probability values associated to
the 12 paths with the same procedure, considering not to in-
stall any protection measure against rockfall in a first stage of
the analysis. The obtained results are summarized in Table 3.
Summing the values of identical outcomes it is possible
to obtain the annual probability of a fatal accident, non fatal
accident and no accident:
P(fatal accident) = P(path 1)+P(path 3)+
P(path 6)+P(path 9) =
2.10·10−3
P(non fatal acc.) = P(path 2)+P(path 4)+
P(path 7)+P(path 10) =
1.80·10−2
P(no acc.) = P(path 5)+P(path 8)+
P(path 11)+P(path 12) =
0.980
(23)
The advantage offered by the installation of protection mea-
sures against rockfall can be evaluated considering that this
Table 3. Results of the 12 paths analysed using the event tree
approach. Probability values without protection measures against
rockfall.
Path Final Annual probability
number consequence of occurrence
1 fatal accident 3.48·10−4
2 non fatal accident 1.39·10−3
3 fatal accident 5.01·10−4
4 non fatal accident 4.51·10−3
5 no accident 0.145
6 fatal accident 8.14·10−5
7 non fatal accident 1.58·10−3
8 no accident 0.148
9 fatal accident 1.17·10−3
10 non fatal accident 1.05·10−2
11 no accident 0.338
12 no accident 0.349
advantage is a function of the catching capacity (C) of the
structure, that is, the percentage of rock that can be stopped
by the protection structure with reference to its position on
the slope, height and energy capacity. Of all the computed
falling trajectories, only a variable percentage can be in-
tercepted by a protection device since some blocks can fly
higher than the possible height of the commercial products
(usually ranging, for the net fences, between 4 m and 6 m) or
the impact energy, due to the block speed, can be higher that
the energy capacity of the designed protection device.
These values obviously differ according to the various de-
sign choices: the position on the slope of the protection de-
vice, which is directly linked to the available space between
the rock slope and the road, the device types that can be in-
stalled, with reference to the local geomorphology and the
event to be faced, etc. (Peila et al., 2006). If the proposed
event tree is used, it is therefore possible to compare the var-
ious choices and evaluate the obtained reduction of collective
risk.
The action of the protection device is expressed by the re-
duction in the number of falling rocks that can involve the
road (Nr ’):
N ′r=(1−C)Nr (24)
In the discussed example, which is characterized by the in-
stallation of a net fence, a catching capacity C=98% has been
considered. This value is not intrinsic of the device, but de-
pends on the local geometrical and geomechanical conditions
and on the statistical evaluation of the falling trajectories. In
this example, 98% of the 5000 forecasted trajectories can be
intercepted by a specific net fence (which is characterised by
an intercepting height and an energy capacity) installed in a
specific position on the slope. It is obvious that if the height
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Table 4. Results of the 12 path analysed using the event tree ap-
proach. Probability values with the installation of protection mea-
sures against rockfall.
Path Final Annual probability
number consequence of occurrence
1 fatal accident 7.08·10−6
2 non fatal accident 2.83·10−5
3 fatal accident 1.59·10−5
4 non fatal accident 1.43·10−4
5 no accident 0.150
6 fatal accident 8.16·10−5
7 non fatal accident 1.58·10−3
8 no accident 0.148
9 fatal accident 3.71·10−5
10 non fatal accident 3.34·10−4
11 no accident 0.350
12 no accident 0.350
of the barrier is changed or its position is modified, the catch-
ing capacity will change. In the example Nr ’ becomes:
N ′r=(1−0.98)Nr=0.02·2.5=0.05 rockfall events/year (25)
If these new input data are assumed to carry out the analysis,
it is possible to observe that the probability that a vehicle
travelling on the road is hit by a falling rock (P1) and the
probability that a travelling vehicle hits a previously fallen
rock (P5) take on the values shown below (Eq. 26):{
P1=3.57·10−5
P5=P10=1.06·10−3 (26)
The occurrence probabilities related to each path are shown
in Table 4 and the total annual probabilities are:
P(fatal accident) = P1+P3+P6+P9=
1.42·10−4
P(non fatal accident) = P2+P4+P7+P10=
2.09·10−3
P(no accident) = P5+P8+P11+P12=
0.998
(27)
It is possible to immediately see the advantages obtained
from the installation of the rockfall protection measures in
the chart shown in Fig. 5.
Once the annual probability of death has been calculated
(collective risk of the road and individual risk for the peo-
ple travelling on the road), under natural conditions and with
different designs of rockfall protection measures, the last step
of the analysis should be a comparison of the computed re-
sults with reference values. This was done, for example, by
Bell and Glade (2004) with reference to the Iceland regula-
tion for the hazard zoning due to snow and landslides, by
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Fig. 5. Accident probability per year, with and without rockfall
protection measures.
Zischg et al. (2005), who compared the risk induced by snow
avalanches with the fatality risk resulting from traffic acci-
dents on the same type of road, by Hoek (2000), who used
the death probability due to dam failures proposed by Nielsen
at al. (1994) and as proposed in many different national stan-
dards and regulations.
4 Conclusions
The collapse of small rock fragments and of single rock
blocks that detach from slopes hanging over roads and rail-
ways, is one of the most frequent hazards for public trans-
portation systems which has to be faced and controlled by
the owner of the infrastructures. Generally speaking, protec-
tion interventions against rockfalls can be considered active
if they prevent instability from occurring or passive if they
are designed to mitigate the effects of a previous movement,
by intercepting and stopping falling rock blocks before they
reach an area where they can cause damages. Prestressed
wire anchors, rock bolts and grouted bars can therefore be
classified as active measures since they prevent the detach-
ment of blocks from their original position, while embank-
ments, ditches, net fences and rock sheds are considered pas-
sive since they do not directly interfere in the process of rock
detachment, but control the dynamic effects of blocks that
have already been detached while moving downhill.
Since in many real conditions, it is technologically and/or
practically to reduce the risk to nil impossible with passive
interventions and the designer can chose between different
technological and geometrical options, it is necessary to have
a tool that is able to allow an easy comparison of the effec-
tiveness of the various choices, in terms of risk reduction.
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 8, 1441–1450, 2008 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/8/1441/2008/
D. Peila and C. Guardini: Rockfall risk analysis 1449
The proposed approach has this aim since, by introduc-
ing in the event tree the concept of a catching capacity of
the passive protection installation, which can be easily calcu-
lated with the statistical computation of falling trajectories, it
is able to compute a reduction of the collective fatality risk
on the studied road. Thus, the best design solution, with ref-
erence to recognized acceptable risk levels, can be chosen
and a cost-benefit analysis can be carried out on the basis of
quantitative values.
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